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Abstract
We show how to use aspect-oriented programming to separate security and trust issues
from the logical design of mobile, distributed systems. The main challenge is how to
enforce various types of security policies, in particular predictive access control policies -
policies based on the future behavior of a program. A novel feature of our approach is
that advice is able to analyze the future use of data. We consider a number of different
security policies, concerning both primary and secondary use of data, some of which can
only be enforced by analysis of process continuations.
1 Introduction
Whilst there is broad agreement that security and other non-functional properties should be
designed into systems ab initio it is also recognized that, as society becomes more IT-savvy,
our expectations about security and privacy evolve. This is usually followed by changes in
regulation in the form of standards and legislation. Thus, whilst we would still argue that
security should feature in the initial design of a system, there is merit in separating out
security and other non-functional properties so that they can be updated without disturbing
the functional aspects of the system.
This paper focuses on designing a language for specifying policies for access control and
explicit flow of information. The traditional approach to enforcing such security policies is to
use a reference monitor [1] that dynamically tracks the execution of the program; it makes
appropriate checks on each basic operation being performed, either blocking the operation or
allowing it to proceed. In concrete systems this is implemented as part of the operating system
or as part of the interpreter for the language at hand (e.g. the Java byte code interpreter);
in both cases as part of the trusted computing base. Sometimes it is found to be more cost
effective to systematically modify the code so as to explicitly perform the checks that the
∗DTU Informatics, Technical University of Denmark, Lyngby, Denmark
†ISST, Imperial College London, London United Kingdom
‡DTU Informatics, Technical University of Denmark, Lyngby, Denmark
§DTU Informatics, Technical University of Denmark, Lyngby, Denmark
1
reference monitor would otherwise have imposed [2]. In any case, even small modification in
the security policies may involve substantial changes in the code or the underlying system.
The notion of aspect-oriented programming [3, 4] is an interesting approach to separation of
concerns. The enforcement of security policies is an obvious candidate for such separation of
concerns, e.g. because the security policy can be implemented by more skilled or more trusted
programmers, or indeed because security considerations can be retrofitted by (re)defining
advice to suit the (new) security policy. The detailed definition of the advice will then make
decisions about how to possibly modify the operation being trapped. This calls for a modified
language (like AspectJ [3] for Java) that supports the use of aspects and where a notion of
trapping operations and applying advice has been incorporated. It is possible to systematically
modify the code so as to explicitly perform the operations that the advice would have imposed
(e.g. [3]).
In many cases the aspect-oriented approach provides a more flexible way for dealing with
modifications in security policies [5, 6, 7, 8, 9] than the use of reference monitors. It facilitates
the use of frameworks for security policies that may be well suited to the task at hand but
that are perhaps not of general applicability and therefore not appropriate for incorporating
into a reference monitor.
Outline of the paper. In this paper we are primarily interested in the modelling of mobile,
distributed systems. The work is based on the coordination language KLAIM [10] (reviewed
in Section 2) that facilitates distribution of data, mobility of code and handling of dynamically
evolving, open systems. The main contribution of the paper is the design of AspectKE, an
aspect-oriented extension of KLAIM that facilitates the trapping of actions (presented in
Section 3) as well as processes (presented in Section 5), which can enforce traditional access
control policies (presented in Section 4) as well as predictive access control policies (presented
in Section 6) – i.e., security policies based on the future behavior of a program.
To evaluate our language design we shall throughout the paper illustrate its features using
a running example based on a health information system for a care facility for the elderly
people in New South Wales, Australia [11]. In Section 4 we show how to use AspectKE to
enforce basic primary use of data policies, that is, policies concerned with the right to access
data. Here we consider the three classical access control models, namely discretionary access
control, mandatory access control and role-based access control [1]. Furthermore, we illustrate
how multiple security policies can be integrated into existing systems thereby allowing policies
to be refined at later stages in the system development. In Section 6 we show how secondary
use of data policies can be modelled; these policies are concerned with how data is used once
it has been obtained [12]. They can be enforced by using predictive access control policy
enforcement mechanism offered by AspectKE. Here we exploit the ability to analyze not only
the behavior of remotely executed processes but also the future use of data. To the best of
our knowledge few, if any, proposals have ever used aspect oriented programming to tackle
secondary use of data policies and provide a predictive access control policy enforcement
mechanism.
Finally, in Section 7 we present related work and we conclude in Section 8 with a discussion of
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N ∈ Net N ::= N1 || N2 | l :: P | l :: 〈
−→
l 〉
P ∈ Proc P ::= P1 | P2 |
∑
i
ai.Pi | ∗P
a ∈ Act a ::= out(
−→
ℓ )@ℓ | in(
−→
ℓλ)@ℓ | read(
−→
ℓλ)@ℓ | eval(P )@ℓ | newloc(!u)
c ∈ Cap c ::= out | in | read | eval | newloc
ℓ, ℓλ ∈ Loc ℓ ::= u | l ℓλ ::= ℓ | !u
Table 1: KLAIM Syntax – Nets, Processes and Actions (Part of AspectKE).
the experience gathered from a proof-of-concept implementation [13] and outline some future
work.
2 Background: KLAIM
AspectKE is an extension of the KLAIM (Kernel Language for Agents Interaction and Mobil-
ity) coordination language [10] with support for aspect oriented programming. In this section
we will review the fragment of KLAIM that will be used for AspectKE in the following section.
KLAIM is a language specifically designed to program distributed systems consisting of sev-
eral mobile components that interact through multiple distributed tuple spaces (databases).
KLAIM uses a Linda-like generative communication model [14] but, instead of using Linda’s
global shared tuple space (shared database), KLAIM associates a local tuple space with each
node of a net. Each node may also have processes associated with it; the KLAIM computing
primitives allow programmers to distribute and retrieve data and processes to and from loca-
tions (nodes) of a net, evaluate processes at remote locations and introduce new locations to
the net.
2.1 Syntax of KLAIM
The syntax of a fragment of KLAIM is displayed in Table 1.
A net (in Net) is a parallel composition of located processes and/or located tuples. For
simplicity, components of tuples can be location constants only1. We use the notation
−→
l to
represent a sequence of location constants and ǫ is used to represent the empty sequence. Nets
must be closed : all variables must be in the scope of a defining occurrence (indicated by an
exclamation mark).
A process (in Proc) can be a parallel composition of processes, a guarded sum of action
prefixed processes, or a replicated process (indicated by the ∗ operator). We write 0 for a
1Compared with the original KLAIM, we do not allow processes to be components of tuples.
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nullary sum, a.P for a unary sum, and a1.P1 + a2.P2 for a binary sum.
An action (in Act) operates on locations, tuples and processes: a tuple can be output to,
input from (read and delete the source) and read from (read and keep the source) a location;
processes can be spawned at a location; new locations can also be created. The actual
operation performed by an action is called a capability (in Cap) – this is a key concept when
formalizing uses of data later. We do not distinguish real locations and data: all of them
are called locations (in Loc) in our setting, which can be location constants l, defining (i.e.
binding) occurrences of location variables !u (where the scope is the entire process to the right
of the occurrence), and use of location variables u.
Well-Formedness of Locations and Actions. We do not allow multiple defining occur-
rences of the same variable in an action. We also prohibit bound variables and free variables
from sharing any name in a single action. Thus we disallow in(!u, !u)@l as well as in(!u, u)@l.
2.2 Semantics of KLAIM
Informally the meaning of a KLAIM program is as follows:
1. a node is selected for the next step of execution
2. if the process at the node is a choice, then one of the enabled choices is chosen non-
deterministically and executed as described in the following four steps
3. if the prefix of the process is an output action, the output is performed
4. if the prefix of the process is an input (either destructive or non-destructive), the input
action is enabled if there is a matching tuple at the target location, and the input is
performed and appropriate variables are bound in the remainder of the process
5. if the prefix is an eval, the process is spawned at the target location
6. if the prefix is a newloc, the network is dynamically extended with a new location and
the continuation process is given the address of that location
7. then return to Step 1
Notice that we do not need to deal with parallelism and replication within nodes because, at
the cost of having duplicate addresses in the network, these can be lifted to the net level.
2.3 Running Example
Health Care Information Systems are gradually becoming prevalent and indispensable to our
society. An electronic health record (EHR), part of a system’s database, stores a patient’s
data and is created, developed, and maintained by the health care providers.
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To illustrate the use of KLAIM, we now introduce a typical EHR system, which is inspired
by [11], and the scenario presented here is used throughout the paper.
The EHR database (EHDB) stores all patient healthcare records and we assume that there
are two types of data recorded for each patient: medical records (MedicalRecord) and private
notes (PrivateNote). Medical records are entries created by doctors and so are the private
notes; however the latter are of a more confidential nature. Also we distinguish between past
records (Past) that have been entered into the EHR system previously and recent records
(Recent) that have been created since the patient was admitted to the hospital. We therefore
assume that the EHR database contains tuples with the following five fields:
patient The name of the patient
recordtype The type of record: MedicalRecord or PrivateNote
author The author of the record
createdtime The time of creation of the record: Recent or Past
subject The record’s content
For example 〈Alice,MedicalRecord,DrSmith,Recent, text〉 is a recent medical record of Alice,
created by DrSmith and it has content text.
Doctors and nurses, as well as the patient, can access a patient’s record. We model these
actors as locations in a network; the process at the location represents the actions of the
individual and the data is the individual’s local “knowledge”. As an example the following
process expresses that DrSmith reads one of the Past medical records for Alice created by
DrHansen before she was admitted to this hospital, writes some of the information in her own
note (in location DrSmith) and then creates a new medical record for the patient:
DrSmith :: read(Alice,MedicalRecord,DrHansen,Past, !content)@EHDB.
out(Alice, content)@DrSmith.
out(Alice,MedicalRecord,DrSmith,Recent, newtext)@EHDB
Here DrSmith will first consult location EHDB and read a five-tuple whose first four com-
ponents are Alice,MedicalRecord,DrHansen, and Past respectively and the corresponding fifth
component is assigned to variable content. The second action will write the content read at
the first action to the location associated with DrSmith. The final construct will write a new
five-tuple to location EHDB for this patient whose last three components indicate that the
author is DrSmith, it is a Recent medical record and the content is newtext.
To illustrate the semantics of KLAIM let us consider the following net, consisting of locations
EHDB and DrSmith:
EHDB :: 〈Alice,MedicalRecord,DrHansen,Past, alicetext〉
|| EHDB :: 〈Bob,PrivateNote,DrJensen,Recent, bobtext〉
|| DrSmith :: read(Alice,MedicalRecord,DrHansen,Past, !content)@EHDB.
out(Alice, content)@DrSmith.
out(Alice,MedicalRecord,DrSmith,Recent, newtext)@EHDB
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The execution may proceed as follows:
EHDB :: 〈Alice,MedicalRecord,DrHansen,Past, alicetext〉
|| EHDB :: 〈Bob,PrivateNote,DrJensen,Recent, bobtext〉
|| DrSmith :: read(Alice,MedicalRecord,DrHansen,Past, !content)@EHDB.
out(Alice, content)@DrSmith.
out(Alice,MedicalRecord,DrSmith,Recent, newtext)@EHDB
→
EHDB :: 〈Alice,MedicalRecord,DrHansen,Past, alicetext〉
|| EHDB :: 〈Bob,PrivateNote,DrJensen,Recent, bobtext〉
|| DrSmith :: out(Alice, alicetext)@DrSmith.
out(Alice,MedicalRecord,DrSmith,Recent, newtext)@EHDB
→
EHDB :: 〈Alice,MedicalRecord,DrHansen,Past, alicetext〉
|| EHDB :: 〈Bob,PrivateNote,DrJensen,Recent, bobtext〉
|| DrSmith :: 〈Alice, alicetext〉
|| DrSmith :: out(Alice,MedicalRecord,DrSmith,Recent, newtext)@EHDB
→
EHDB :: 〈Alice,MedicalRecord,DrHansen,Past, alicetext〉
|| EHDB :: 〈Alice,MedicalRecord,DrSmith,Recent, newtext〉
|| EHDB :: 〈Bob,PrivateNote,DrJensen,Recent, bobtext〉
|| DrSmith :: 〈Alice, alicetext〉
DrSmith first reads the tuple 〈Alice,MedicalRecord,DrHansen,Past, alicetext〉 from EHDB; the
binding of the variable content is reflected in the continuation of the process. In the second
step DrSmith outputs a tuple that consists of Alice together with a bound content (alicetext)
to her own tuple space. In the final step, a new tuple that represents a new medical record is
written to location EHDB.
3 AspectKE: Trapping Actions
We now show how to integrate aspects into KLAIM by presenting the basic features of
AspectKE, with a focus on how aspects trap actions in a KLAIM program. We consider
a global set of aspects.
3.1 Syntax
The Syntax of AspectKE is given by Tables 2 and 1 (the KLAIM syntax).
Table 2 introduces a system S (in System) that consists of a net N and a sequence of global
aspect declarations −→asp. An aspect declaration (in Asp) takes the form A[cut] , body: A is
the aspect name, and body (in Advice) is the advice to the trapped action. Each action (the
Act in Table 1) is a potential join point that can be intercepted by AspectKE’s pointcut (in
Cut).
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S ∈ System S ::= let −→asp in N
asp ∈ Asp asp ::= A[cut] , body
body ∈ Advice body ::= case (cond) sbody ; body | sbody
sbody ::= break | proceed
cut ∈ Cut cut ::= ℓ :: ca
ca ∈ CAct ca ::= out(
−→
ℓt )@ℓ | in(
−→
ℓλ
t
)@ℓ | read(
−→
ℓλ
t
)@ℓ | eval(X)@ℓ | newloc( )
cond ∈ BExp cond ::= ℓ1 = ℓ2 | cond1 ∧ cond2 | cond1 ∨ cond2 | ¬ cond
| test(
−→
ℓt )@ℓ | ∃u ∈ set : cond | ∀u ∈ set : cond
set ∈ Set set ::= {ℓ} | set ∩ set | set ∪ set
ℓt, ℓ
λ
t ∈ Loc ℓt ::= ℓ | ℓ
λ
t ::= ℓ
λ |
Table 2: AspectKE Syntax - Aspects for Trapping Actions
Moreover, is introduced as a don’t-care parameter in the cut version of actions, and in the
test primitive of conditional expressions (BExp). It can match any type of location used in
the program. Note in the cut, the occurrence of !u and u have different meaning from those
of KLAIM; a plain variable in a pointcut can only match an actual location and banged (!)
variables in the pointcut can only match against binding occurrences of variables, while the
don’t-care ( ) can match both in the join point.
Each aspect gives a unique run-time suggestion (either break or proceed) which may de-
pend on the evaluation of a conditional expression. The suggestion break suppresses the
trapped action whilst proceed allows the trapped action to be executed. In case of mul-
tiple aspects that trap an action, break takes precedence over proceed. The primitive
test(
−→
ℓt )@ℓ evaluates to tt if a tuple exists in the tuple space of ℓ which matches
−→
ℓt . Besides
basic boolean expressions, condition cond also includes bounded existential quantification and
universal quantification – this allows simple queries to the databases occurring in the nets.
In contrast to other aspect languages, the condition is part of the advice instead of being part
of the pointcut (being evaluated before intercepting a join point). Evaluating the condition
after intercepting a join point allows a more natural modelling of security policies.
Well-formedness of Cuts. In addition to the well-formedness conditions for KLAIM, we
require that the variables in a cut are pairwise distinct. We shall also impose that aspects are
closed : any free variable in the body is defined in the cut. Additionally, when !u is used in a
cut pattern, u should not be used in conditions except in the context of set expressions.
Example 1 To illustrate how aspects can be composed in AspectKE that work with the KLAIM
7
program, the following simple aspect gives advice to the running example in section 2.3.
Aout
1
[user :: out( , data)@DrSmith]
, case(data = alicetext)
break;
proceed
The aspect traps an out action of processes running at location DrSmith that attempt to send
a tuple with two fields. If the actual value of the second field is equal to alicetext, the aspect
will break the execution of the action and its continuation process. Otherwise, the action
continues.
3.2 Semantics
The base semantics is that of KLAIM (Section 2) but now, before executing an action (all
actions in a KLAIM program are potential join points), we check to see if any aspect applies
to the action and combine the advice of all applicable aspects. Each advice is either that the
action be allowed to proceed or not. We resolve possible conflicts by ensuring that any aspect
that disallows an action has priority. Aspects are applied in definition order but, because
aspects can only allow or disallow the join point to proceed, the order is actually immaterial.
Example 2 Suppose we have a system that contains the same net as in running example of
Section 2.3 and aspect Aout
1
in Example 1:
let
Aout
1
[user :: out( , data)@DrSmith]
, case(data = alicetext)
break;
proceed
in
EHDB :: 〈Alice,MedicalRecord,DrHansen,Past, alicetext〉
|| EHDB :: 〈Bob,PrivateNote,DrJensen,Recent, bobtext〉
|| DrSmith :: read(Alice,MedicalRecord,DrHansen,Past, !content)@EHDB.
out(Alice, content)@DrSmith.
out(Alice,MedicalRecord,DrSmith,Recent, newtext)@EHDB
and some steps of execution (omitting the aspect definition):
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EHDB :: 〈Alice,MedicalRecord,DrHansen,Past, alicetext〉
|| EHDB :: 〈Bob,PrivateNote,DrJensen,Recent, bobtext〉
|| DrSmith :: read(Alice,MedicalRecord,DrHansen,Past, !content)@EHDB.
out(Alice, content)@DrSmith.
out(Alice,MedicalRecord,DrSmith,Recent, newtext)@EHDB
→
EHDB :: 〈Alice,MedicalRecord,DrHansen,Past, alicetext〉
|| EHDB :: 〈Bob,PrivateNote,DrJensen,Recent, bobtext〉
|| DrSmith :: out(Alice, alicetext)@DrSmith.
out(Alice,MedicalRecord,DrSmith,Recent, newtext)@EHDB
→
EHDB :: 〈Alice,MedicalRecord,DrHansen,Past, alicetext〉
|| EHDB :: 〈Bob,PrivateNote,DrJensen,Recent, bobtext〉
|| DrSmith :: 0
Aspect Aout
1
does not trap the read action, thus the read action executes and binds content
with alicetext. But Aout
1
traps the first out action, and the result substitution is
[DrSmith/user, alicetext/data]
and the case condition data = alicetext evaluates to tt, thus the aspect breaks the execution of
this action and its continuation process.
4 Worked Examples: Advice for Access Control Models
To evaluate the expressiveness of the language and show its language features, we now show
how AspectKE can be used to enforce access control policies by utilizing three well-known
access control models, namely discretionary access control (Section 4.1), mandatory access
control (Section 4.2) and role-based access control (Section 4.3), and how AspectKE can
introduce new aspects for retrofitting new policies to existing systems (Section 4.4).
Since patient confidentiality is an important issue in the health care industry it is imperative
that EHRs are protected [15]. To help achieve this goal, governments define many types of
security policies, encapsulated in various acts and guides (e.g. [16, 17]). Throughout the
paper, we will enforce several security policies for the EHR system that was introduced in
Section 2.3 and this shows different features of the language.
The first is a primary use of data policy inspired by [11] which regulates the basic access
control concerning the read and write rights owned by doctors and nurses:
Doctors can read all patients’ medical records and private notes, while nurses can
read all patients’ medical records but cannot read any private notes. Medical records
and private notes can only be created by doctors.
For simplicity, here we restrict ourselves to only focussing on read, in and out actions, while
eval and newloc actions will be discussed further when enforcing other security policies.
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4.1 Discretionary Access Control
We will show how to enforce the above policy with discretionary access control (DAC), which
is a type of access control as a means of restricting access to objects based on the identity
of subjects and/or the groups to which they belong[18]. We do so by using an access control
matrix containing triples (s, o, c) identifying which subjects s can perform which operations c
on which objects o. If we use the KLAIM programming model, we should equip the semantics
of KLAIM with a reference monitor that consults the access control matrix when an action
is executed to check if the action is permitted. In AspectKE we can directly use aspects to
elegantly inline the reference monitor to enforce this discretionary access control policy.
Example 3 The access control matrix is stored in location DAC, which contains tuples:
〈user, recordtype, capability〉. For example, if DrSmith is a doctor and NsOlsen is a nurse,
then DAC might contain the following tuples:
〈DrSmith,MedicalRecord, read〉
〈DrSmith,PrivateNote, read〉
〈DrSmith,MedicalRecord, out〉
〈DrSmith,PrivateNote, out〉
〈NsOlsen,MedicalRecord, read〉
We also assume that the location DAC can only be modified by privileged users, thus doctors
and nurses cannot perform any in and out action on it. This can be enforced by other aspects
but we omit them here.
The following aspect declarations will impose the desired requirements.
Areadp1A1 [user :: read( , recordtype, , , )@EHDB]
, case(test(user, recordtype, read)@DAC)
proceed;
break
Ainp1A2 [user :: in( , recordtype, , , )@EHDB]
, case(test(user, recordtype, in)@DAC)
proceed;
break
Aoutp1A3 [user :: out( , recordtype, , , )@EHDB]
, case(test(user, recordtype, out)@DAC)
proceed;
break
Aspects Areadp1A1 , A
in
p1A2
, and Aoutp1A3 enforce the above policy by using DAC, where the access rights
for each user are actually described. Note that the second field of the tuple operated by these
cut actions is recordtype, which trap an action that clearly specifies a concrete record type.
Consider the following KLAIM program that is a variant of the running example in Section
2.3 (in that the user is nurse NsOlsen instead of doctor DrSmith) and is equipped with the
above four aspects:
NsOlsen :: read(Alice,MedicalRecord,DrHansen,Past, !content)@EHDB.
out(Alice, content)@NsOlsen.
out(Alice,MedicalRecord,NsOlsen,Recent, newtext)@EHDB
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The first read action will be trapped by aspect Areadp1A1 , and the resulting substitution is
[NsOlsen/user,MedicalRecord/recordtype]
and the condition test(NsOlsen, MedicalRecord, read)@DAC is evaluated. Since NsOlsen has
the appropriate right according to DAC we proceed and perform this read action thereby giving
rise to the binding of content to alicetext.
The second action will not be trapped by any of the aspects, so it will simply be performed and
the tuple 〈Alice, alicetext〉 is output to location NsOlsen.
The last action will be trapped by aspect Aoutp1A3 and after the substitution we evaluate the
condition test(NsOlsen, MedicalRecord, out)@DAC which is evaluated to ff and thus we break
the execution.
However, the KLAIM program can also execute read or in actions without specifying the
record type, e.g., using ! recordtype instead of recordtype, users can thus get a record as
follows:
NsOlsen :: read(Alice, !recordtype ,DrHansen,Past, !content)@EHDB
where a successful input action can retrieve any type of EHR record.
None of the above aspects can trap these input actions, thus we have to enforce additional
aspects so that the above input actions will not bypass our aspects and consequently break the
policy. The simple aspects forbid any attempts to read or in (read and then remove) EHR
records without specifying the record type:
Areadp1A4 [user :: read( , !recordtype, , , )@EHDB]
, break
Ainp1A5 [user :: in( , !recordtype, , , )@EHDB]
, break
One may wonder why not build the above two aspects on top of aspects Areadp1A1 and A
in
p1A2
by
directly replacing recordtype with ! recordtype in their pointcut, respectively. The reason is
that these aspects will not be well-formed: when trapping actions, recordtype binds with a
variable, which cannot be used in a test condition such as test(user, recordtype, read)@DAC.
4.2 Mandatory Access Control
In this subsection we will show how to enforce the above policies by using mandatory access
control (MAC), which is a means of restricting access to objects based on the sensitivity (as
represented by a label) of the information contained in the objects and the formal autho-
rization (i.e., clearance) of subjects[18]. Before enforcing the above policy, we first impose a
comparable classical MAC policy - the Bell-LaPadula security policy [1] based on a mandatory
access control model. Later we enforce the above policy as a variant of the Bell-LaPadula
policy. In the presentation, security levels are assigned to subjects (as clearances) and objects
(as labels).
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Example 4 In this scenario, we just need two security levels, and may assign security levels
to subjects as follows: doctors have level high and nurses have level low; similarly we may
assign objects as follows: private notes have level high and medical records have level low.
To model this policy we need to introduce a location MAC that stores tuples of the form:
〈user, securitylevel〉 and 〈recordtype, securitylevel〉. Continuing Example 3, we create the
location MAC with the tuples:
〈DrSmith, high〉
〈NsOlsen, low〉
〈PrivateNote, high〉
〈MedicalRecord, low〉
As before we also assume that the location MAC can only be modified by privileged users.
Firstly, we enforce the Bell-LaPadula security policy [1] to illustrate that AspectKE can enforce
a well-known mandatory access control policy. Then we will enforce our example policy, with
small modifications based on the aspects that enforce Bell-LaPadula policy.
If we enforce the Bell-LaPadula security policy, the first part of the policy states that a subject
is allowed to read or input data from any object provided that the subject’s security level domi-
nates that of the object. In our case, this guarantees no read up: that is, low subjects (nurses)
cannot read high objects (private notes) but can only read low objects (medical records); how-
ever, high subjects (doctors) can access both kinds of records.
The no read up part of the policy can be enforced by aspects as follows:
Areadp1B1 [user :: read( , recordtype, , , )@EHDB]
, case(¬(test(user, low)@MAC ∧ test(recordtype, high)@MAC))
proceed;
break
The second part of the policy (a simplified form of Bell-LaPadula star property [1]) states that
a subject can write to any object provided that the security level of the object dominates that
of the subject (no write down). In our case high subjects (doctors) cannot write low objects
(medical records) but low subjects (nurses) can write to both kinds of records.
The no write down of the policy can be enforced by the aspect below:
Aoutp1B2 [user :: out( , recordtype, , , )@EHDB]
, case(¬(test(user, high)@MAC ∧ test(recordtype, low)@MAC))
proceed;
break
Additionally, we have an aspect for the read action to prevent users from reading records
without specifying the record type, and an aspect for the in action to prevent users from
reading and deleting records:
Areadp1B3 [user :: read( , !recordtype, , , )@EHDB]
, break
Ainp1B4 [user :: in( , , , , )@EHDB]
, break
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These aspects correctly enforce our policy about reading patient records. However, the no write
down policy is not quite right for our example, instead we depart from the Bell-LaPadula policy
and define:
Aoutp1B2′ [user :: out( , recordtype, , , )@EHDB]
, case(test(user, high)@MAC)
proceed;
break
This aspect allows doctors to write any kind of record.
The aspect Aoutp1B2′ together with A
read
p1B1
,Areadp1B3 ,A
in
p1B4
reflect a mandatory access control model
which satisfies our policy. In this case we only allow high users (doctors) to write patient
records. Hence nurse NsOlsen in Example 3 cannot execute the third action as it will be
blocked by Aoutp1B2′ , which would be allowed with A
out
p1B2
from the Bell-LaPadula security policy.
4.3 Role-Based Access Control
Role-based access control (RBAC) [19] is another access control mechanism which allows the
central administration of security policies and is often more flexible and elegant for modelling
security policies. The simplest model in the RBAC family is RBAC0, where there are three
sets of entities called user, role, and permission. A user can be assigned multiple roles (role
assignment) and a role can have multiple permissions (permission assignment) to correspond-
ing operations. In addition, the user can initiate a session during which the user activates
some subset of roles that he or she has been assigned. A user can execute an operation only
if the user’s active roles have the permission to perform that operation.
Example 5 To implement the security policy for patient records, we use a model that does
not differentiate a user’s assigned role and active role (we assume that the assigned roles of
all users are activated by default), so we only need location RDB with tuples 〈user, role〉:
〈DrSmith,Doctor〉
〈NsOlsen,Nurse〉
For permission assignment we also need a location to describe each role’s permission. This
can be done by storing tuples 〈role, object, capability〉 at PDB:
〈Doctor,MedicalRecord, read〉
〈Doctor,PrivateNote, read〉
〈Doctor,MedicalRecord, out〉
〈Doctor,PrivateNote, out〉
〈Nurse,MedicalRecord, read〉
Once more we assume that the locations RDB and PDB can only be modified by privileged
users.
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The following aspects then implement the required policy:
Areadp1C1 [user :: read( , recordtype, , , )@EHDB]
, case(∃role ∈ {Doctor,Nurse} :
(test(user, role)@RDB ∧ test(role, recordtype, read)@PDB))
proceed;
break
Ainp1C2 [user :: in( , recordtype, , , )@EHDB]
, case(∃role ∈ {Doctor,Nurse} :
(test(user, role)@RDB ∧ test(role, recordtype, in)@PDB))
proceed;
break
Aoutp1C3 [user :: out( , recordtype, , , )@EHDB]
, case(∃role ∈ {Doctor,Nurse} :
(test(user, role)@RDB ∧ test(role, recordtype, out)@PDB))
proceed;
break
These three aspects are useful for interrupting the execution when a user attempts to operate
on EHR records with a concrete record type, which essentially relies on the tuples from RDB
and PDB. They also show the benefit of admitting quantifiers into the conditional expressions.
Similar to the previous subsections, we have to enforce additional aspects for capturing user
attempts to access EHR records without specifying the record type.
Areadp1C4 [user :: read( , !recordtype, , , )@EHDB]
, break
Ainp1C5 [user :: in( , !recordtype, , , )@EHDB]
, break
In the following sections we will use the role-based access control mechanism since it is best
suited for enforcing security policies in a large organization.
4.4 Advice for Retrofitting Policies
Now we will show how aspects in AspectKE can retrofit new security policies into an exiting
system that is being developed/updated or has already been deployed. Concretely, when a
new functionality has been introduced to the existing system we will show how we enforce new
policies to cater for the new requirements (Section 4.4.1); when a policy has been proposed to
refine existing policies, we will show how we enforce policies based on the existing functionality
of the system (Section 4.4.2); on the other hand, sometimes additional functionality has to be
introduced to the system to implement aspects which refine existing policies (Section 4.4.3).
Indeed, the possibility to refine, renew and retrofit security policies into an existing/evolving
system is very important for IT systems. Taking the EHR system as an example, as the public
debate about security standards (especially for privacy) evolves, governments have to modify
the corresponding acts and guides. As a consequence, the security policy for an EHR system
will undergo frequent change [20]. Moreover, the IT system itself will always be enhanced
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by new functionalities, which means that new policies need to be enforced. The National IT
Strategy for the Danish Health Care Service states that “it is also important to acknowledge
the fact that IT is not just implemented once and for all”[21].
4.4.1 Enforcing Security Policy for New Functionality
AspectKE can be used for enforcing new security policies when a new functionality has been
introduced at any phase of the system development. The running example in Section 2.3
introduces the functionality of the EHR system as regards reading and writing from and to
the EHR database (EHDB). Now we introduce another (new) function to the EHR system
that enables a manager to add a patient, or delete information from the system.
In our programming model, each patient is represented by a location. A manager can add a
new patient to the system as follows:
MgDavis :: newloc(!patient).out(patient,Patient)@RDB
First a new location for the patient is created, then it is registered in the role database RDB
by the out action. To delete a user one can simply perform an in action to the location RDB.
We shall now show how to enforce the following security policy regarding the manager role at
the hospital[11], for this new added functionality.
In the hospital, only managers are allowed to add a user to, or delete from the
system.
Example 6 The following aspects will enforce the above security policy.
Anewlocp2 [user :: newloc( )]
, case(test(user,Manager)@RDB ∧ test(Manager, Location, newloc)@PDB)
proceed;
break
Aoutp2 [user :: out( , )@RDB]
, case(test(user,Manager)@RDB ∧ test(Manager,RDB, out)@PDB)
proceed;
break
Ainp2[user :: in( , )@RDB]
, case(test(user,Manager)@RDB ∧ test(Manager,RDB, in)@PDB)
proceed;
break
These aspects are composed in a way that is similar to the Example 5. Before using them we
need to put the tuple 〈MgDavis,Manager〉 into RDB and the tuples 〈Manager, Location, newloc〉,
〈Manager,RDB, out〉, and 〈Manager,RDB, in〉 into PDB. Finally, once again we assume that
PDB can only be modified by privileged users.
Example 6 shows that AspectKE can enforce a policy for new functionality (code), no matter
when this functionality is developed, potentially in the entire life cycle of the EHR system.
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This is because the underlying aspect-oriented mechanism allows new aspects to intercept
all join points (including a join point of new code) and give appropriate advice. Example 6
also shows how to give advice on an action (newloc) that creates new node in a net. Note
that Examples 5 and 6 use the role-based access control model which shows that the tuples
introduced above at PDB are good at expressing permissions that only directly rely on roles
and objects. However, some permission assignments are more complex and therefore we shall
also use logical formulae to express permission assignments in the following sections.
4.4.2 Refining Security Policy with Existing Functionality
AspectKE can be used to to refine an existing security policy at any phase of the system
development. The following is a policy which can be considered as a refinement of the previous
policy (enforced by Example 3-5) to protect patients’ privacy. This policy is also inspired by
[11]:
Private notes can only be viewed on the basis of the doctor-patient confidentiality
– doctors cannot view private notes that were not created by themselves; nurses
can only view recent medical records which were created after the patient has been
admitted.
Traditional programming paradigms normally necessitate modifying existing code to enforce
this extra policy, while the aspect approach simply requires additional aspects.
Example 7 The first part of the policy can be expressed by the aspects shown below. These
two aspects will prevent a doctor from reading a private note written by another doctor or
reading a private note without clearly specifying the author of the note.
Areadp31 [user :: read( ,PrivateNote, author, , )@EHDB]
, case(test(user,Doctor)@RDB ∧ (user = author))
proceed;
case(¬test(user,Doctor)@RDB)
proceed;
break
Areadp32 [user :: read( ,PrivateNote, !author, , )@EHDB]
, case(¬test(user,Doctor)@RDB)
proceed;
break
Note that the second case of Areadp31 and A
read
p32
allow any users registered in RDB except doctors
to read a private note, which includes users taking roles as nurses. Allowing nurses to read a
private note is not problematic, as these two aspects only reflect the intention of this policy.
Preventing nurses to read a private note is enforced in the previous policy.
These two aspects are supposed to work together with those aspects defined in the Examples
3 to 5. For example if a nurse tries to read a private note, these aspects will proceed the
execution but aspects in Examples 3-5 will suggest break. Another example is if a doctor tries
to read a private note written by other doctors, aspects in Examples 3-5 will allow the action
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to proceed whilst these aspects will break the execution. Since break takes precedence over
proceed, the final decision suggested from this advice will be to block the execution in both
cases.
The second part of the policy says that nurses can only read recent medical records which
can be expressed by the following aspects where, once again, the aspects should be considered
in conjunction with those of Examples 3 to 5. These two aspects will prevent a nurse from
reading a past medical record or reading a medical record without specifying the created time.
Areadp33 [user :: read( ,MedicalRecord, , createdtime, )@EHDB]
, case(test(user,Nurse)@RDB ∧ createdtime = Recent)
proceed;
case(¬test(user,Nurse)@RDB)
proceed;
break
Areadp34 [user :: read( ,MedicalRecord, , !createdtime, )@EHDB]
, case(¬test(user,Nurse)@RDB)
proceed;
break
Note that no new functionality is required to enforce this policy, as these aspects only rely on
the existing program (i.e., node RDB).
4.4.3 Refining Security Policy with New Functionality
Sometimes refining an existing security policy is necessary. We have to introduce additional
functionality to support the implementation of the aspects for policy refinement. Now we
consider the following security policy that restricts access to the database to certain locations
in the hospital [22]:
A nurse can only read medical records of the patients who are in the wards located
on the nurse’s working floor. Furthermore, the nurse can only access medical
records through the computers that are located on that specific floor. But in the
emergency room, a nurse does not have this restriction.
Example 8 To express this policy as aspects we shall assume that the current location database
CLDB records every user’s current location information (indicating that they are using com-
puters at that location), and that the assigned location database ALDB stores every user’s
assigned room (e.g. for nurses this is their working floors and rooms which they are responsi-
ble for; for patients this is the floors and wards that they are on). These two databases store
tuples with the same fields 〈user, f loor, room〉 and can only be modified by privileged users.
The set Floor contains the actual floors of the hospital (e.g. f1,f2). The set Room contains
the actual rooms of the hospital and includes two types of rooms: ordinary wards (e.g. w1,w2)
and the special room EmergencyRoom.
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The appropriate advice can now be expressed as follows:
Areadp41 [user :: read(patient,MedicalRecord, , , )@EHDB]
, case(test(user,Nurse)@RDB∧
∃floor ∈ Floor : test(user, f loor,EmergencyRoom)@CLDB)
proceed;
case(test(user,Nurse)@RDB∧
∃floor ∈ Floor ∃room ∈ Room : ( test(user, f loor, room)@CLDB∧
test(user, f loor, room)@ALDB∧
test(patient, f loor, room)@ALDB))
proceed;
case(¬test(user,Nurse)@RDB)
proceed;
break
Areadp42 [user :: read(!patient,MedicalRecord, , , )@EHDB]
, case(test(user,Nurse)@RDB∧
∃floor ∈ Floor : test(user, f loor,EmergencyRoom)@CLDB)
proceed;
case(¬test(user,Nurse)@RDB)
proceed;
break
In Areadp41 , the first case caters for the situation where a nurse is working in the emergency
room; the second case allows the read action when a nurse is trying to access the medical
record for a patient who is on the same ward/floor as where the nurse is currently at and
assigned to work, the third case allows a user who is not a nurse to perform the read action.
The aspect Areadp42 is similar to the aspect A
read
p41
except that it does not contain the second case.
This is because reading a medical record without specifying the name of the patient is not
acceptable for a nurse who is not working in the emergency room.
As in Example 7, these aspects will work together with all previously introduced security polices.
Moreover, these aspects are both in the spirit of role-based access control, and they demonstrate
that when composing aspects in AspectKE for larger and more complex security policies of an
organization, role-based access control can be very efficacious, as has already been observed in
the literature [19].
Note new functionality has to be introduced to enforce this policy such as the newly introduced
nodes for databases (e.g., CLDB, ALDB). This new functionality can be developed as part of
the main logic of the EHR system, or can be merely developed and maintained to enforce
security policies. We observe that although we might need to extend the functionality of
the system’s main logic to enforce certain security policies, the policies themselves are still
described in aspects (even though they directly or indirectly rely on new nodes/processes),
which are still separated out of the main logic.
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5 AspectKE: Trapping Processes
5.1 Motivation
Classical reference monitors are incapable of enforcing security policies based on the future
behavior of programs, rather they rely only on information gathered by monitoring execution
steps [23], and perform history-based dynamic checks. However, security polices concerned
with information flow that cannot be implemented correctly without a security check of the
overall behavior of the program exist.
For example, in a software system, remote evaluation involves the transmission of programs
from a client to a server for subsequent execution at the server. However, as the programs
transmitted might perform unintended operations at the server side, a security check is usually
needed. A typical example of this is Java applets which can be transferred to a remote system
and executed by the Java Virtual Machine (JVM). Since the unknown applets are not always
written by trusted users, the JVM has certain mechanisms for ensuring that the applet will
not be able to do malicious actions, e.g., the bytecode verifier [24] and sandbox mechanism
[25].
As another example, in the EHR domain, rather than enforcing the primary use of data
policies for direct patient care domain as shown in the previous sections, there is a trend
to define and enforce secondary use of data policies. Here data is used outside of direct
health care delivery that includes activities such as analysis, research, public health etc, even
though it still lacks a robust infrastructure of policies and is surrounded with complex ethical,
political, technical and social issues [12]. Compared with primary use of data, whose focus is
on regulating “someone has some rights to access some data”, it focuses on defining ”how the
data can be used after it is released to someone”. The enforcement of such policies requires
security checks in the form of inspection of the flow of data.
In general, program analysis techniques concern computing reliable, approximate information
about the dynamic behavior of programs [26], and the derivation of useful information by
simulating execution of all possible paths of the executing program. For example, type systems
can be used to enforce various kinds of information flow as well as access control security
policies (like Jif [27] for Java).
In this section, we extend the AspectKE language presented in Section 3 which enables
AspectKE not only to trap the action, but also to trap a process that is to be executed
in the future. The process can be a process that is to be sent to a remote site, or a process
continuation of a trapped action. This enables us to perform simple forms of program analy-
ses, called behavior analysis, that syntactically inspect the trapped processes, i.e., actions in
a new thread to be executed (at local/remote sites) or the remaining actions in the current
thread. In the following section, we will show how to use simple behavior analysis techniques
to enforce various security policies that require checking of the future behavior of a program,
the so-called predictive access control policies, and that detect and prevent execution of the
potential malicious operations at the earliest stage.
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5.2 Extended Syntax and Semantics
cut ∈ Cut cut ::= · · · | ℓ :: ca.X
cond ∈ BExp cond ::= · · · | c ∈ set | ℓ ∈ set | set = ∅
set ∈ Set set ::= · · · | {c} | Act(X) | Locc(X) | FV(X) | FVc(X) | LC(X) | LCc(X) | LVar∗
Table 3: AspectKE Syntax - Aspects for Trapping Processes
Table 3 shows the extended syntax of AspectKE.
The pointcut (Cut) in Table 2 has been extended with ℓ :: ca.X, which not only binds the
action, but also binds the program continuation after the trapped action to a variable X.
Table 3 extends BExp and set in Table 2, which can be used for defining properties that re-
quire syntactic analysis of the processes to be executed (usually the continuation of the trapped
action bound by X). The set-forming behavior analysis functions Act, Locc, LC, LCc,FV,FVc
will be explained in the following sections when needed, but we have collected their definitions
in Table 4 where fv, bv, lc, cap and loc are the obvious extraction functions for free variables,
bound variables, location constants, capabilities and target locations, respectively.
Note these functions expose different data-flow information of processes bound by process
variables, and can be used to enforce predictive access control policies, namely access control
policies that depend on the future behavior of a program.
Example 9 To illustrate how aspects in the extended AspectKE trap a KLAIM program and
extract its properties, the following aspect gives advice to the running example in section 2.3.
Aread
2
[user :: read( , , , , )@DrSmith.X ]
, case(out ∈ Act(X))
break;
proceed
This aspect traps a read action of processes running at location DrSmith, when reading a tuple
with five fields. The process continuation of the trapped action will be recorded in variable X.
Function Act returns all actions in processes represented by X. If the actual process bound
by X contains any out actions, the aspect will break the execution of the action and its
continuation process. Otherwise, the action continues.
Suppose we have a system that contains the same net as in running example of Section 2.3
and aspect Aread
2
:
let
Aread
2
[user :: read( , , , , )@DrSmith.X ]
, case(out ∈ Act(X))
break;
proceed
in
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Act(P1|P2) = Act(P1) ∪ Act(P2)
Act(Σiai.Pi) =
⋃
i
({cap(ai)} ∪ Act(Pi))
Act(∗P ) = Act(P )
Locc(P1|P2) = Locc(P1) ∪ Locc(P2)
Locc(Σiai.Pi) =
⋃
i
({loc(ai) | cap(ai) = c} ∪ Locc(Pi))
Locc(∗P ) = Locc(P )
LC(P1|P2) = LC(P1) ∪ LC(P2)
LC(Σiai.Pi) =
⋃
i
(lc(ai) ∪ LC(Pi))
LC(∗P ) = LC(P )
LCc(P1|P2) = LCc(P1) ∪ LCc(P2)
LCc(Σiai.Pi) =
⋃
i
({lc(ai) | cap(ai) = c} ∪ LC(Pi))
LCc(∗P ) = LCc(P )
FV(P1|P2) = FV(P1) ∪ FV(P2)
FV(Σiai.Pi) =
⋃
i
(fv(ai) ∪ (FV(Pi) \ bv(ai)))
FV(∗P ) = FV(P )
FVc(P1|P2) = FVc(P1) ∪ FVc(P2)
FVc(Σiai.Pi) =
⋃
i
({fv(ai) | cap(ai) = c} ∪ (FVc(Pi) \ bv(ai)))
FVc(∗P ) = FVc(P )
Table 4: Behavior Analysis Functions
EHDB :: 〈Alice,MedicalRecord,DrHansen,Past, alicetext〉
|| EHDB :: 〈Bob,PrivateNote,DrJensen,Recent, bobtext〉
|| DrSmith :: read(Alice,MedicalRecord,DrHansen,Past, !content)@EHDB.
out(Alice, content)@DrSmith.
out(Alice,MedicalRecord,DrSmith,Recent, newtext)@EHDB
and some steps of execution (omitting the aspect definition):
EHDB :: 〈Alice,MedicalRecord,DrHansen,Past, alicetext〉
|| EHDB :: 〈Bob,PrivateNote,DrJensen,Recent, bobtext〉
|| DrSmith :: read(Alice,MedicalRecord,DrHansen,Past, !content)@EHDB.
out(Alice, content)@DrSmith.
out(Alice,MedicalRecord,DrSmith,Recent, newtext)@EHDB
→
EHDB :: 〈Alice,MedicalRecord,DrHansen,Past, alicetext〉
|| EHDB :: 〈Bob,PrivateNote,DrJensen,Recent, bobtext〉
|| DrSmith :: 0
Aspect Aread
2
traps the read action, whose result substitution is
[DrSmith/user,
out(Alice, content)@DrSmith.out(Alice,MedicalRecord,DrSmith,Recent, newtext)@EHDB/X ]
Here Act(P ) ⊆ {out, in, read, eval,newloc} is the set of capabilities performed by the process
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P (see Table 4). In this case, Act returns set {out}, the case condition evaluates to tt, thus
the aspect breaks the execution of this action and its continuation process.
6 Worked Examples: Advice for Usage Control
In this section, we now show how to use the extended AspectKE to enforce security policies
that require behavior analyses of processes to be executed in the future, and we clarify the
meaning of set-forming behavior analysis functions (from Set in Table 3 and 4) through
examples – enforcing several predictive access control EHR security polices to the target EHR
system presented in Section 2.3. In Section 6.1, we show how to enforce policies by utilizing
the set-forming functions that check properties of remotely evaluating processes. In Section
6.2, we show how to enforce policies by checking properties of the continuation process at the
current thread.
6.1 Remote Evaluation
Using the action eval, AspectKE can easily express a process’s remote evaluation. More-
over, using behavior analysis, AspectKE can check the content of the transmitted process
by composing various aspects that embody different security considerations. This gives us a
flexible way of controlling the use of remote processes. We will enforce a security policy in a
distributed mobile environment that has to consider both direct and indirect access to tuple
spaces, and in the latter case AspectKE shows great usefulness.
Consider a policy concerning removal of data from the system [11]:
Doctors, nurses and patients are not allowed to delete records from the database –
only the administrator of the database can do that.
Thus, in terms of AspectKE, only the administrator is allowed to perform an in action on the
EHR database.
Example 10 In section 4.1-4.3, we introduced aspects for restricting the in actions to access
the EHR database when enforcing a basic access control policy. Here we shall slightly update
them to reflect the new policy. As we prefer to use the role-based access control model, we
show how to update the relevant aspects in Section 4.3.
For aspect Areadp1C1 , we need to add role Administrator to role set, while updating tuple spaces RDB
with tuple 〈AdWalker,Administrator〉, and PDB with tuples 〈Administrator,MedicalRecord, in〉
and 〈Administrator,PrivateNote, in〉.
In aspect Ainp1C5 , we have forbidden all users to delete records from the EHR database. Now
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we relax this requirement and replace it with the following aspect.
Ainp5[user :: in( , !recordtype, , , )@EHDB]
, case(test(user,Administrator)@RDB
proceed;
break
This breaks direct attempts to perform in actions, only actions by the administrator are al-
lowed.
This advice only deals with direct attempts to delete data; we also have to cater for processes
like
NsOlsen :: eval
(
in(patient, !recordtype, !author, !createdtime, !subject)@EHDB
)
@AdWalker
where anyone (e.g., NsOlsen) who spawns an arbitrary process on the administrator Ad-
Walker’s node can behave as an administrator and delete the records.
This behavior can be captured by an aspect for eval actions that targets the AdWalker location,
without using any behavior analysis functions.
Aevalp5A [user :: eval(Y )@AdWalker.X ]
, case(test(user,Administrator)@RDB)
proceed;
break
However, this aspect is too restrictive as it disallows the possibility for other users to perform
well-behaved actions on behalf of an administrator (e.g., out,read etc.).
Using behavior analysis functions, we are able to check the process in advance so that less re-
strictive policies can be enforced. For example, the following aspect prevents remotely spawned
in actions on AdWalker, but allows other types of action.
Aevalp5B [user :: eval(Y )@AdWalker.X ]
, case(test(user,Administrator)@RDB)
proceed;
case(test(user, )@RDB ∧ ¬(in ∈ Act(Y )))
proceed;
break
Here Act(P ) is the set of capabilities performed by the process P (see Table 4). It follows
that any in actions within Y will be trapped. There is no restriction for actions other than in
actions, so remote code can still perform actions like out and read.
We may want to be more liberal and allow in actions on locations distinct from EHDB. To do
so we introduce Locin(P ) to be the set of locations ℓ, where in(· · ·)@ℓ occur in P ; note that
this set may include location constants as well as location variables (see Table 4).
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Rather than aspects Aevalp5A and A
eval
p5B
, we could use the aspect:
Aevalp5C [user :: eval(Y )@AdWalker.X ]
, case(test(user,Administrator)@RDB)
proceed;
case(test(user, )@RDB ∧ (LVar⋆ ∪ {EHDB}) ∩ Locin(Y ) = ∅)
proceed;
break
where LVar⋆ is the set of all location variables in the program. This aspect allows users to
perform an in action on behalf of an administrator when the target locations will never be
EHDB, which is the least restrictive aspect for enforcing the same policy.
Example 10 shows that whilst security policies may be very simple to enforce superficially,
execution of remotely spawned code might easily invalidate policies which appear to be rea-
sonable. Using aspects, we are able to elegantly update the enforcement of the security policy
to cater for this. Furthermore, the examples also illustrate AspectKE’s capability of checking
the remote code before it is executed, which gives the users greater flexibility to enforce a less
restrictive but more precise policy.
One might wonder whether combining the use of newloc and eval actions will break the
above security policies. Consider the following example:
NsOlsen :: newloc(!u).out(u,Administrator)@RDB.
eval
(
in(patient, !recordtype, !author, !createdtime, !subject)@EHDB
)
@u
Here NsOlsen tries to create a new location, register it to RDB, then execute the in action
from the new location. This attempt will not work: if policy Anewlocp2 and A
out
p2 from Example
6 are still enforced, NsOlsen is neither able to create any new location nor update RDB since
only a Manager can do that.
In fact, all aspects defined in this paper will directly break any action executed at a location
that has not been registered in RDB, and this includes all attempts to use newloc and eval
to bypass the security policies as shown above, as only the manager can update RDB through
aspects defined in Example 6.
6.2 Using Program Continuations
Now we show how AspectKE can trap the continuation process and use behavior analysis
functions to get the future behavior of the executing process, which enables the advice to
control and avoid executing the malicious processes as early as possible.
As we have mentioned before, our society is moving in the direction of trying to exploit patient
healthcare records that already exist for new purposes (known as secondary use of data). At
the Canadian Institute of Health Research [28] it is stated that “health research based on the
secondary use of data contributes to our present level of understanding of the causes, patterns
of expression and natural history of diseases.” This raises new challenges for developing an
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effective system to ensure people’s rights to privacy and confidentiality: decisions concerning
access control decisions are not only based on the right of access of different principals but
should also examine how the data is to be used after access has been provided.
For example, researchers who are making secondary use of data should not be able to access
the identity of patients. Therefore we want to prevent them from executing a process like
RsMiller :: read(patient, !recordtype, !author, !createdtime, !subject)@EHDB
which explicitly specifies the patient whose records the researcher is interested in reading. We
can easily compose aspects that forbid the researcher from performing such actions (but allow
nurses, doctors, etc . . . ) that are similar to those aspects that have been shown in Section 4.
In order for the researcher to blindly get a patient’s healthcare record, the researcher may
perform a process such as
RsMiller :: read(!patient, recordtype, !author, !createdtime, !subject)@EHDB
The difference between the read action in this program and those in the previous examples is
the use of ! in front of patient, i.e., the researcher does not specify which patient’s healthcare
record is to be read. However, after the researcher has obtained the healthcare record, s/he
can still use the patient’s identity. We might want to prevent the researcher from executing
a process like
RsMiller :: read(!patient,MedicalRecord, !author, !createdtime, !subject)@EHDB.
out(patient, subject)@Publication
(1)
whereas it would be acceptable to execute the process
RsMiller :: read(!patient,MedicalRecord, !author, !createdtime, !subject)@EHDB.
out(subject)@Publication
(2)
since the second program will not use the identity of the patient whose record has been
selected.
The following policy is extensively discussed and accepted around the world and is specified
directly or indirectly in a number of codes (e.g. [17, 28, 29, 12]):
Researchers should not read and use the patient’s healthcare records of an EHR
system in a way that might potentially expose the identity of the patient.
Example 11 The following aspects, which replace the aspects Areadp1C1 and A
read
p1C4
in Example 5,
enforce this policy, which enforce both the basic access control policies for doctors and nurses,
and policies for the researchers regarding their rights to read EHR records. It is necessary to
revise the aspects because our previous development was only for primary use of data.
Areadp61 [user :: read(patient, recordtype, , , )@EHDB.X ]
, case(∃role ∈ {Doctor,Nurse} :
(test(user, role)@RDB ∧ test(role, recordtype, read)@PDB))
proceed;
break
Areadp62 [user :: read(patient, !recordtype, , , )@EHDB.X ]
, break
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Areadp63 [user :: read(!patient, recordtype, , , )@EHDB.X ]
, case(∃role ∈ {Doctor,Nurse} :
(test(user, role)@RDB ∧ test(role, recordtype, read)@PDB))
proceed;
case(test(user,Researcher)@RDB ∧ ¬(patient ∈ FV(X)))
proceed;
break
Areadp64 [user :: read(!patient, !recordtype, , , )@EHDB.X ]
, case(test(user,Researcher)@RDB ∧ ¬(patient ∈ FV(X)))
proceed;
break
Aspect Areadp1C1 is replaced/divided by aspects A
read
p61
and Areadp63 , according to whether a patient
name is clearly specified or not. Similarly, Areadp1C4 is replaced/divided by aspects A
read
p62
and
Areadp64 . In both cases, additional conditions regarding researchers are only added to aspects
when a patient name is not specified, i.e., Areadp63 and A
read
p64
. In these two aspects, the behavior
analysis function FV is used, which returns the set of free variables of P (see Table 4).
In our case the aspect Areadp63 will bind X with the out actions of the above two programs: in pro-
gram (1) with out(patient, subject)@Publication, and in program (2) with out(subject)@Publication.
Thus ¬(patient ∈ FV(X)) would be evaluated to ff for the first case and to tt for the second
case. Using this extra information from the behavior analysis function, the advice can be based
on some properties of the future execution of the continuation process (in particular, whether
or not patient will ever be used). And the suggestions from aspect Areadp63 would be break
for the first case and proceed for the second one. Note at the point that the access control
decision has been made, !patient in the join point read action is still a defining occurrence
variable and thus does not bind with any actual location yet, and behavior analysis merely
analyses the future behavior of process based on its static information.
The above aspect is too restrictive since it forbids the execution of meaningful read actions
as well. As one of the case studies performed by the Canadian Government [28] indicates:
In practice, the researchers might need to do some data linkage operations between
different databases.
For example, we may allow the researcher to extract several records for the same patient from
different databases and put that information together as in the process
RsMiller :: read(!patient,MedicalRecord, !author, !createdtime, !subject1)@EHDB.
read(patient,MedicalRecord, !author, !createdtime, !subject2)@EHDB2.
out(subject1 , subject2 )@Publication
(3)
where we introduce another EHR database EHDB2 that is located at another hospital.
Now there are two databases so we need to consider which policies are suitable for each
of them, respectively. For illustration purposes, we might simply demand that the second
database has the same security policy as the original one. Thus the second read action would
be denied, since the original policy prohibits a researcher from reading a specific patient’s
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healthcare record. Because of this, establishing data linkage in the direct manner of program
(3) will never work.
To make the data linkage work we can restrict the researcher’s access to the data through
a trusted location (EHDB for example) by remote evaluation, and let the trusted location
perform the actual data linkage actions. In this way the policy will allow the second read
action whenever it is executed from the trusted location:
RsMiller :: eval
(
read(!patient,MedicalRecord, !author, !createdtime, !subject1)@EHDB.
read(patient,MedicalRecord, !author, !createdtime, !subject2)@EHDB2.
out(subject1 , subject2 )@Publication)
@EHDB
(4)
As demonstrated in the last subsection, if remote evaluation is allowed, we need to pay closer
attention to the overall security of the system. For example, in the event that the researcher
attempts to get a doctor to link databases and output the private information as in
RsMiller :: eval
(
read(!patient,MedicalRecord, !author, !createdtime, !subject1)@EHDB.
read(patient,MedicalRecord, !author, !createdtime, !subject2)@EHDB2.
out(patient, subject1 , subject2 )@Publication)
@DrSmith
(5)
or in the event that the researcher attempts to obtain the records of a patient whose name is
selected from his own tuple space either before evaluating a process at an EHR database or
during the evaluation procedure.
RsMiller :: read(!patient)@RsMiller.
eval
(
read(patient,MedicalRecord, !author, !createdtime, !subject1 )@EHDB.
read(patient,MedicalRecord, !author, !createdtime, !subject2)@EHDB2.
out(patient, subject1 , subject2 )@Publication)
@DrSmith
(6)
RsMiller :: eval
(
read(!patient)@RsMiller.
read(patient,MedicalRecord, !author, !createdtime, !subject1)@EHDB.
read(patient,MedicalRecord, !author, !createdtime, !subject2)@EHDB2.
out(patient, subject1 , subject2 )@Publication)
@DrSmith
(7)
we need an aspect that inspects the actions performed by a researcher performing an eval
action on all the EHR databases or locations other than the EHR databases.
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Example 12 This motivates the aspect:
Aevalp7 [user :: eval(Y )@dest .X ]
, case(test(user,Researcher)@RDB ∧ test(dest,DataBase)@RDB)∧
∀x ∈ LCread(Y ) : ¬(test(x,Patient)@RDB)∧
∀y ∈ Locread(Y ) : (test(y,DataBase)@RDB) )
proceed;
case(test(user,Researcher)@RDB∧
(¬test(dest,DataBase)@RDB ∧ test(dest, )@RDB)∧
∀x ∈ Locout(Y ) : (test(x,DataBase) ∨ x ∈ {dest}) )
proceed;
case(¬test(user,Researcher)@RDB ∧ test(user, ))
proceed;
break
The first case of the aspect ensures that a researcher can directly evaluate processes in the
EHR databases if s/he is not able to get the name of the patient whose record s/he is trying to
obtain either before evaluation or during evaluation (by reading a patient name from a location
other than EHR databases). Note that LCread(P ) is a set of location constants in read actions
of process P (defined in Table 4). The second case guarantees that when sending a process to
other remote locations, the process only contains out actions that are performed on the EHR
databases (trusted locations) or the tuple space associated with that remote location.
In summary, the examples in this section show the versatility of AspectKE when dealing with
remote evaluation and future execution paths of processes. We illustrated the usefulness of
each behavior analysis function when enforcing access control policies that requires the future
behavior of process. When selecting the appropriate behavior analysis functions, it is possible
to enforce less restrictive policies and avoid the execution of malicious processes as early as
possible. More importantly, in a highly complex and privacy related computing environment,
with policies that are changed frequently such as the EHR system, enforcing various access
control and data usage policies through security aspects shows the potential of being a very
flexible and elegant approach.
7 Related Work
7.1 Policy Enforcement Mechanisms and Aspect Oriented Programming
There are various techniques for enforcing security policies, the most traditional one is a
reference monitor that observes software execution and dynamically mediates all access to
objects by subjects. Instead of mixing the monitoring code in the target system, Inlined
Reference Monitors (IRMs) [2] use a load-time, trusted program rewriter to insert security
code into a target application, resulting in a self-monitoring application that performs security
checks as it executes. There are many IRM systems implemented by various program rewriters
(e.g. [30, 31, 32, 33]), ensuring that different types of application will obey their corresponding
security policies.
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Independently, the aspect-oriented programming (AOP) paradigm [3] has emerged and has
served as another effective mechanism for tackling the same issue. Indeed security is naturally
identified as one kind of crosscutting concern that aspect-oriented programming was designed
to deal with: instead of using a rewriter to inject monitoring code, security policies are coded
through aspects which are invoked when the target program executes certain actions. There is
a close connection between AOP and IRM. Hamlen and Jones [34] propose an aspect-oriented
security policy specification language SPoX for enforcement by IRMs which establish a formal
connection between AOP and IRMs. JavaMOP[35] implements IRM by using AspectJ aspects
as the instrumentation mechanism. AspectKE takes the AOP approach to internalize the
reference monitor for enforcing security policy to tuple space systems, and directly encodes
security concerns in aspects.
Most research focuses on the class of security policies that can be enforced by monitoring
execution of a target system [23] and hence are enforceable by traditional reference monitors.
AspectKE allows us to perform a behavior analysis on future execution of the target system,
giving us the capability of enforcing policies that go beyond reference monitors. In [36], the
authors outline several promising methods for enforcing security policies: IRM, type systems
and certifying compilers. The authors also argue that synergies among these approaches will
achieve remarkable results. We believe our approach – aspects with behavior analysis – is
comparable as an alternative to IRM with Type systems.
Several AOP languages can identify the data-flow and control-flow between join points, which
can serve as powerful policy enforcement mechanisms. AspectJ’s cflow[3] captures the control
flow between join points. Dataflow pointcut [37] identifies join points based on the dataflow of
information. Tracematches[38] can give advice based on the execution history of computation.
However, these systems can only refer to the past and current events, in contrast AspectKE
can refer to future events. A few AOP languages propose mechanisms so that aspects can
be triggered by control flow of a program in the future, e.g, pcflow[39] and transcut[40],
however, they lack support for providing dataflow information in the future as AspectKE does.
Some advanced AOP languages (e.g.,[41, 42]) offer ways of referring to the future behavior of a
program in the aspect, which in theory can be used for specifying security policies that depend
on the future control-flow and data-flow. However, as they usually lack formal semantics and
also normally only offer access to low level (e.g., bytecode-level) information of a program,
this makes it hard to understand and develop appropriate underlying analyses for enforcing
security policies. Moreover, they lack high level abstraction for presenting the analysis results
as AspectKE’s behavior analysis functions do, which makes it non-trivial to use the results for
composing security policies. The formal semantics of AspectKE clarifies the way of developing
useful behavior (program) analyses and presenting the analysis results through appropriate
language abstraction, and formally pave a way of integrating program analysis techniques into
the policy specification and enforcement procedure.
7.2 Security With Aspect-Oriented Programming
There are many papers that explore the AOP mechanism to enforce security policies. One
line of work directly or indirectly use the popular Java-based general purpose AOP languages
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like AspectJ [3], Hyper/J [43], CaesarJ [44] to express and enforce security policies.
In [45] the authors present general guidelines for how to compose access control aspects in
AspectJ, while in [46] an enforcement of application-specific policies in an access control
service is implemented in CaesarJ. Phung and Sands [8] identify classes of reference monitor-
style policies that can be defined and enforced by AspectJ and present a method to realize
some history-dependent security policies which cannot be naturally expressed in AspectJ.
Ramachandran et al. [47] discuss using AspectJ for implementing multilevel security and
demonstrate how aspects, in comparison to traditional programming, can guarantee better
security assurance. Similarly, AspectKE can be used to enforce a wide range of security
policies but focuses on access control and explicit flow of information.
Oliveira et al. [48] use their own rewrite-based system to express access control policies and
then map them into an AspectJ program; in [49], availability requirements are expressed
in a formal model that combines deontic and temporal logics, and are then translated into
availability aspects in AspectJ. One advantage of these approaches is that policies can be
formalized through security oriented languages which are more suitable for security consider-
ations than general purpose languages, another advantage is that some policy languages have
a formal semantics which enables formal verification. AspectKE is designed with security in
mind and has a formal semantics which will enable us to reason about the AspectKE’s policies
in future work.
Even though these well-known AOP languages are industrial strength and can be readily
used for a policy enforcement mechanism, they have their limitations: it is very hard to
apply these AOP languages to the types of systems we have been studying. For example, the
languages are designed for programs that run on a local machine, and they do not naturally
support pointcuts for a distributed system. They also lack a pointcut mechanism to capture
the future execution of a program, and thus are unable to enforce predictive access control
policies. These issues are explicitly addressed by AspectKE. Particularly, we are the first to
report how to use aspect oriented programming techniques to enforce secondary use of data
policies that are becoming increasingly important in large IT systems.
As we have done, some researchers design their own special purpose aspect languages or
systems to study security enforcement mechanisms. For example, HarmlessAML [5] is an
aspect-oriented extension of Standard ML, and has a type system that guarantees well-typed
harmless advice does not interfere with mainline logic computation. AspectKE is an aspect-
oriented extension of a tuple space system, with a different research focus, aim at enforcing
access control policies to a distributed computing model and studying how properties obtained
from the behavior analyses can be used to specify access control policies. As mentioned earlier,
in [37] the dataflow pointcut is proposed which specifies where aspects should be applied based
on the origins of values in the past execution, which is useful in a situation where flow of
information is important. AspectKE tackles similar issues, but checks the flow of information
in the future.
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7.3 Distribution with Aspect-Oriented Programming
Much work has been done regarding how to deploy and weave aspects for distributed systems:
some work is relevant for language design of distributed AOP with explicit distribution [50,
51, 52], other work explores the implementation of AOP middleware to support distributed
AOP [53, 54, 55]. AspectKE is closer to the language design of distributed AOP which
naturally follows the KLAIM programming model and uses remote pointcuts [50] that identify
join points in a program running on a different location. However, AspectKE does not aim
at enhancing the flexibility of mechanisms to deploy, instantiate and execute distributed
aspects, e.g., support advice execution over remote hosts, as AWED [51] and ReflexD [52] have
achieved, rather it focuses on integrating analysis components for reasoning about the local
or mobile processes to support advanced access control in a distributed setting. Compared
with these languages, AspectKE provides a well defined security enforcement mechanism to
tuple space systems that supports process mobility.
AO4BPEL[56] is an aspect extension of the process-oriented composition language BPEL,
which was originally designed for composing Web Services. Work in [57, 58] discusses differ-
ent principles of using AOP to implement coordination systems (in AspectJ), but that are
not related to security. Recently, another variant of AspectK, AspectKB [59] has been pro-
posed; it uses Belnap Logic to deal with conflicts when distributed advices are composed in a
coordination environment.
7.4 Security in Coordination Languages and Security Policy Languages
AspectKE extends KLAIM, first presented in [10], later evolved into the KLAIM family
(reviewed in [60]), including cKlaim, OpenKlaim, HotKlaim, OKlaim and X-Klaim etc. The
prototype language of KLAIM is Klava [61], implemented in Java and has proved to be suitable
for programming many distributed applications involving code mobility and our AspectKE*
prototype language [13] is built on top of it. Regarding policy enforcement of these languages,
some authors use control and data flow analyses that are written in the Flow Logic approach
(e.g. [62, 63]), others use type systems (e.g. [64]), and [65] combine these two lines of work.
They can be used to enforce very advanced security policies, however, all of them require the
user to explicitly annotate policies in the main code (e.g. attach policies to each location),
while our approach avoids this by specifying them inside the aspects, thus achieving a better
separation of concerns.
Secure shared date-space coordination languages can be classified into two categories with
regard to the underlying access control mechanisms [66]: the entity-driven approach (addi-
tional information, associated to resources such as tuple spaces, tuples and single data fields,
list the entities which are allowed to access the resources) e.g., Secure Lime [67] and KLAIM
[10]; and the knowledge-driven approach (resources are decorated with additional information
and the processes can access the resources only in the event that they prove to keep the
knowledge of such additional information) e.g., SecOS [68] and SecSpaces [69]. Our approach
is suitable for expressing access control policies that fit both an entity-driven approach and a
knowledge-driven approach, as the additional information is essentially expressed in aspects
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and is directly embedded in neither resources nor processes. Moreover, this additional infor-
mation is not limited to the past and current facts used in the previous work, e.g., password
[67], locks [68] or partitions [69], but also facts about the future, e.g., how particular data will
be used, which is useful for enforcing predictive access control policies that only AspectKE
can enforce.
Binder [70] and Cassandra [20] are very powerful logic-based security policy languages, which
are both based on the datalog logic-programming language. In [20], there is a substantial
case study performed using Cassandra that is based on the UK National Health Service
procurement exercise. In AspectKE, our security policies are mainly expressed based on
logical formulae and predicates in the aspects. The difference is AspectKE also provides
predicates that can also describe future events. There are other prominent policy languages
like Protune [71], Rei [72], Ponder [73], and KeyNote [74], which can express basic access
control policies very well. Only Ponder and Rei can express usage control through obligation
policies but, unlike our approach, neither language can enforce them and has to trust that
the party receiving the data uses it in proper ways [75].
8 Conclusion
8.1 Our Experience of a Proof-of-Concept Implementation
We have designed and implemented a proof-of-concept programming language AspectKE*
[13], based on the core concepts of AspectKE, which can be compiled and executed under
a Java environment for building secure distributed systems and is freely distributed2. The
runtime system of AspectKE* is built on top of Klava [61]. Klava, a Java package that
implements the core concept of KLAIM, can be used to program tuple space operations for
building distributed systems.
AspectKE* is generally implemented following the semantics of AspectKE, however, it takes
a different approach regarding the implementation strategy of the behavior analyses. When
aspects need the results of behavior analysis functions, AspectKE needs to perform the cor-
responding behavior analyses at runtime for each step of program execution, which is not
practical enough due to the potential large runtime overhead. On the other hand, AspectKE*
uses a two-staged implementation strategy that gathers fundamental static analysis informa-
tion at the process’s load-time (the analyses are performed on the bytecode representation of
the processes), and evaluates the program analysis predicates and functions (similar to the
behavior analysis functions) at runtime by combining the results of the load-time analysis and
runtime information, which efficiently implements the conceptual model of AspectKE.
We implemented a secure tuple space based EHR workflow system in AspectKE*, and all
aspects presented in the previous sections are implemented, except for aspect Aevalp7 , as the
behavior analysis functions LC and LCc are not currently supported by AspectKE*. Besides
the EHR system, we also built a secure tuple space based chat application in AspectKE*. In
2http://www.graco.c.u-tokyo.ac.jp/ppp/projects/aspectklava.en
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[13] we show how to enforce access control policies which require analysis of future behavior
of a process onto a chat system that contains untrusted components. These two applications
demonstrate that the AspectKE model can be efficiently implemented and executed in real
world settings.
8.2 Final Words and Future work
We have presented AspectKE, an aspect-oriented extension of the coordination language
KLAIM [76]. This has provided a concrete vehicle for presenting our approach; the distributed
tuple spaces provide a natural model of the kind of system that motivated our work. However,
the approach could equally well be applied to more classical process algebraic languages; the
join points in this case being read and write accesses to channels.
Compared with our previous work AspectK [77], AspectKE empowers aspects to trap not
only the matched actions but also the process continuation and the processes being evaluated
remotely. AspectKE also provides various behavior analysis functions and enables us to reason
about the future execution of processes, which improves the capability of standard reference
monitors that normally only deal with history based security policies. To achieve this, we
simplify AspectK so that actions before and after proceed or break are not allowed. If we
had allowed these actions, a safe behavior analysis would be very difficult to achieve, since
the processes to be executed might execute more actions (inserted by aspects at runtime) than
planned. This is an interesting direction for the future work and will require more powerful
program analyses than the behavior analyses of the present paper.
We evaluated the expressiveness of AspectKE by investigating its policy enforcement capabil-
ity through examples in an EHR setting. We have demonstrated that AspectKE can enforce
discretionary access control, mandatory access control as well as role-based access control.
Furthermore, AspectKE can elegantly retrofit new policies to an existing system with mini-
mum effort at any phase during the system development cycle. We have also shown that in
a distributed and mobile system, the information flow is very hard to control. AspectKE can
enforce a range of predictive access control policies to cater for this issue, through composing
aspects that check remote evaluation and the program continuation. We enforce both primary
and secondary use of data, which shows that AspectKE is suitable to cater for old as well
as new challenges in such a complex distributed computing environment, where security and
privacy are of great importance. We also briefly report the experience of our proof-of-concept
implementation of AspectKE, namely AspectKE*, and its usage for enforcing the security
policies presented in this paper to an EHR workflow system and enforcing other security
policies to a chat application.
The examples presented in this paper were chosen so as to illustrate the different character-
istics of AspectKE, but they were also chosen so as to constitute a complete set of access
control policies. Here we conjecture that our aspects indeed enforce the complete set of access
control policies, but in order to validate our conjecture we need to apply a formal validation
method to it.
There are other challenging secondary use of data policies which require control not only of
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direct flows but also of indirect flows [78]: e.g. after storing specific data into a doctor’s
own tuple space, the doctor should not allow them to be transferred into a researcher’s tuple
spaces by indirectly passing through another location. In this case, checking all the parallel
executing processes with existing security aspects that rely on more advanced static analyses
[26] might be needed (e.g. to predict all possible data that can be stored in a certain tuple
space [62, 63]).
We find that the combination of aspects with behavior and static analysis techniques shows
great potential for serving as a flexible and powerful mechanism for policy enforcement, and
as a promising method of building security and trust in a distributed and mobile environment.
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